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I 
·. 
Speech of Senator Mike Maa•fi eld 
WITH THE TRUCE IN KOREA, ANOTHER CH.APTEllllf'THE BOOK 
\{/ 
OF 1-nSTORY M!JST BE CONSIDERED. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA DEPENDS ON THE MAINTENANCE OF A SOUND 
MILl TARY POLICY, KEYED TO THE DANGERS OF THE ATOMIC AGE 
AND AT THE SAME TIME TIED TO THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
FRAMEWORK OF OUR CAPITALISTIC SYSTEM. THERE IS NO CHEAP, 
NO EASY NOR SURE SOLUTION TO THE DIFFICULTIES WlflCH CONFRONT 
US IN THIS DAY AND AGE. THERE IS NO SINGLE POSSIBLE WEAPON 
WHICH WILL AUTOMATICALLY WIN WARS OR BY ITS VERY DESTRUC-
TIVENESS PREVENT THEM. THE AGE IN WHICH WE LIVE CALLS FOR 
CLEARER TI-nNKING, FACING UP TO REALITIES, AND SOUND DECISIONS. 
TIDS PERIOD CALLS FOR STEADINESS IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND 
CONTINUITY IN OUR MILITARY STRENGTH. THE AGE IN WlflCH WE 
LIVE POSES FOR US THE POSSIBILITY THAT WARS MAY BE RECURRENT 
AND UNTIL A PEACEFUL AND SECURE WORLD IS ACHIEVED, WE MUST, 
IN MY OPINION, OPERATE ON THAT ASSUMPTION. 
I REALIZE FULL WELL THAT THE IDEALISTS AMONG US THINK 
THAT A BETTER WAY OF LIFE CAN BE ACHIEVED FOR ALL PEOPLE 
TO THE END THAT WARS WILL BE ABANDONED FOREVER. I WISH 
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THAT I COULD HOLD TO THIS IDEAL. I PRAY THAT IT CAN COM 
TllUE BUT AS A ~TTER OF PRACTICAL NECESSITY, 1 A.F.RAID 
THAT LONG SOUGHT- FOR DAY IS BEYOND THE PERIOD OF OUR 
IMMEDIATE HISTOlUCAL FUTURE. IN LINE WITH OUR R.ESPONSl-
BILlTIES, E CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO KEEP OUI\ GUARD - -
THAT ts OUR DEFENSES ~- DOWN. AS THE LEADING NATION AMONG 
THE FREE COUNTRlES OF THE ORLD, E MUST ASSUME A Btm.DEN 
OF LEADERSHIP IF THE PEOPLES IN THIS AREA AllE TO RETAIN 
ANY DEGREE OF THE FR.EEDO WHICH WE NOW ENJOY. WE CANNOT 
AFFORD UPS AND DOWNS 1N EITHER OUR MIL!T AllY OR FOREIGN 
POLICY AND WE SHOULD RECOONtZE THE FACT THAT THESE 
FREEDOMS WHICH WE ENJOY WERE PAID FOil WITH OUR BLOOD 
AND OUR TREASURE. WE MUST REALIZE FUR.TH&:ll THAT IF WE 
ARE TO llETAIN THESE FREEDOMS, WHICH TOO MANY OF US 
ACCEPT COMPLACENTLY. WE MUST BE PREPAllED TO PAY, AND 
IF NEED BE, TO FIGHT FOR THEIR llETENTlON. 
IN THE PRESENT WORLD THERE ARE TWO GREAT Jli.DWERS 
BEHIND HICH, TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, THE REST 
OF THE WORLD 1S ALIGNED. THOSE POWEllS AS THE WOl\LD WELL 
KNOWS ARE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF 
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SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. THE TACTICAL CHANGES IN 
RUSSIAN POLICY 
BRING THE BOYS HOME AND LAPSE INTO A PERIOD WinCH USED 
TO BE CALLED "NORMALCY". 
THE SOVIET'S IDEA TO BRING AMERICA TO ITS KNEES IS 
TWO-FOLD; ONE, TO WEAKEN OUR ECONOMY TO SUCH AN EXTENT 
THAT WE WILL HAVE A DEPRESSION AT HOME. TWO, TO CAUSE 
A SPLIT BETWEEN OUR ALLIES AND OUR.SEL VES. HONEYED ORDS 
BY THE SOVIETS SHOULD ~OT LULL US INTO A SENSE OF FALSE 
SECURITY ECAUSE UNLESS THESE WORDS ARE TRANSFORMED 
INTO DEEDS, .AND UNTIL THESE DEEDS PROVE WHAT THEY MEAN, 
THEltE CAN BE NO LET UP 1M THE DEEP SEATED FRICTION WHICH 
EXISTS BETWEEN THE FREE AND SLAVE WOllLD. AMERICANS 
WOULD BE FOOLISH TO THINK THAT THE SKIES ABOVE AND THE 
OCEANS ON BOTH SIDES FUB.NISH US WITH A llEALL Y PROTECTIVE 
BAIUUEll. WE KNOW 'mAT WE AR.E VERY VULNERABLE AND BECO -
INO UORE SO EACH DAY AS SPACE-DEVOU.RlNCi, OCEAN-SPANNING 
AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES. SUBMARINES THAT CAN CROSS THE OCEANS 
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SUBMERGED AND ATOWC WEAPONS .AilE DEVELOPED. THE FACT 
THAT OTHER. F ONTIERS ARE VULNERABLE DOES OT MEAN ANY 
LESS SECURITY FOR THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR OWN OUTER 
LIFE LINES. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEIUOUSL Y CRIPPLING 
ATTACK AGAINST THE SHORES OF THE UNITED STATES IS OMEnnNG 
WE MUST RE:MEMBER AT ALL TIMES AND ON THAT BASIS WE MUST 
AN 
DO ALL WE CAN TO BlUNG ABOUT, IF POSSIBLE,/AWARENESS OF 
n1E DANGER SUCH AN ATTACK MIGHT BRING. lj; 
~ .... 
ACCORDING TO OUR BEST INFORMED SCIENTISTS, WE HAVE 
ABOUT A FOUR YEAR LEAD IN THE ATOMIC ARMS RACE IN RELATION 
TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN THREE ATOMIC 
DETONATIONS IN RUSSIA. 1E KNOW THAT THE UNITED STAT S 
HAS DETONATED AT LEAST 4:4 A-WEAPONS OF ALL TYPES FROM 
CITY-BUST ItS TO ATOMIC SHELLS FIRED BY CANNON. LAST 
FALL FOil THE ST TIME A HYDROGEN DEVICE LEW AN ISLAND 
OFF THE MAP OF THE PACIFIC AND RELEASED THE EQUIVALENT 
IN POWER. OF MORE THAN FIVE MILLION TONS OF TNT .AlS COMP A.R.E.D 
TO THE 15, 000 - ZO, 000 TON BOMB OF IDROSWMA AND THE ZO, 000 
TON BOMB OF NAGASAKI. IN WORLD WAR TWO AMERICAN AIR 
FORCE PLANES ALL OVER THE WORLD DROPPED ONLY T 0 
:WXLLIO'N TONS OF BOMBS; TODAY 100 B-50 AIRPLANES WITH ONE 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 15, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
--5--
NAGASAKI TYPE BOMB W OLD EQUAL THAT AMOU T . THE 
HYDROGE M IS TO THE A 0 C THE ATOMIC 
BOMB IS TO T T . 'IE ARE FI T • L Y IN THE HYDROGEN 
AG AND ALL THE E VICES F THE UNIT D STATES 
ARE NO BEGINNING T CE VE ODUCTION VE IONS OF 
GUIDED MISSILE AND A...ttE .A.LSO CO TINUI G TO DEVELOP STILL 
FUR. THER THE TERlUBLt!: GER AN N VE GASES, DEVELOPED IN 
,ORLD WART _ ,ANDEV N 0 E TOXIC GASES. THIS TECHNOLOGICAL 
EVOLUTIO.~. IN E S H DEC D, OT !NCR. ASED, OU!l 
SECURITY AND THIS FACTOR SH ULD FULLY UND STOO BY 
ALL OF US. IN PRACTlCIJ....L Y EVERY ELD OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
RESEA.R.CH IN THE EAPONS OF DESTRUCTION, WE MUST ASSUME, 
.AND I TJUN RIGHTLY SO, THAT TH VIE UNIO IS MOVING 
ALONG PARALLEL ATHS. THE SOVIET UNION TODAY HAS, IT 
HAS BEEN ESTIMATED, A STOCKPIL 0 B TWEEN 100-115 ATOMIC 
~EAPONS. IN THE OPINION 0 CER.TAt HIGH R.A.NKINO OFFICIALS 
OF THE UNIT D STATES AIR FO CE, SHE LL HAVE UGH 
ATOMIC WEAPONS BY MID 1954 TO SUSTAI AN ATOMIC OFFENSIVE 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OUR ALLI AND THE PLANES 
TO CARllY THE BO BS. OUR ATOMIC VANTAGE IN QUANTITY 
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AND QUALITY OF WEAPONS WILL 1 OT BE OF MUCH COMFORT TO 
US IF D FIHEN SUCH TIME (;OMES, UT EITHE.. lLL IT 
TOO :.1 CH OF AN ADV ANT E TO AN AGGRESSO BECAUSE THE 
AGGB.E R OWS THAT THE TALIATION WILL BE TERRIBLE 
AND IN KIND. 
IN THE ATTE.. OF HYDAOG N MBS, . E MIGHT JUST AS 
\fELL FA.C ..... UP TO THE FACT THAT THE USSIANS HAVE THEIR 
SCIEN'nSTS 1110!UQN 0 ~ 'I1nS PROBLEM AND THAT ITS DEVELOPMENT 
WILL BE SOMEWHAT PARALLELL TO OU • WE CAN SEE THEREFORE 
THAT RUSSIA IN THE FL~.AJ .. ANALYSIS IS T ETTING WEAKER 
BUT IS, 1 FACT, GETTING STRONGER ALL THE TIME. THEIR 
TACTICS MAY BE CHANGED TEMPOllARILY BUT NOT THEIR STRATEGY. 
THEIR. ULTIMATE GOAL I STILL THE SAME- SECURITY FOR THE 
SOVIET UNION AND WORLD CONQUEST. THESE T 0 OBJECTIVES -
CAN AND SHOULD BE VIE ED AS MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AND 
IDENTICAL. 
TURNI G TO THE IICONOMY OF OU COUNTRY WE CAN SEE 
THAT EVEN HERE E ARE E TElUNG A PElUOD F DANGER. IN 
TilE PAST FEVI YEA.E THE UNITED STATES HAS CHANGED ROM A 
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11HA VE" TO A "HAVE NOT .. N ... \.TION. .FOil THE FIRST "nilE IN OUR. 
IDSTO. Y, WE ARE IMPOllTING WOllE THAN 50~ OF OUR RAW 
MATERt F OM SOURCES OUTSIDE OF OUR OWN FRONTIERS. 
THIS FACT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND FOll A BETTER. UNDEltST AND-
ING OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND IT 
SHOULD BRING HOME TO ALL OF US, THE CONTINtJING RELIANCE 
WIUCH WE WILL HAVE ON OTHER NA"nONS AS SOUllCES OF SUPPLY 
FOR THESE RAW STRATEGIC MATERIALS. THE PRESENT ADMINISTRA-
TION HAS, AND I BELIEVE RIGHTLY, PREPARED ITSELF NOT FOR 
ANY DEFINITE DATE OF DANG!o.R. BUT FOR. AN INDEFINITE 
CONTINUATION OF DANGER. 
B CAUSE OF THE REASONS ENUMERATED, WE SHOULD 
COGNIZE THAT WE FACE FAR. Gll.EATER. mFnCULnES IN 
THE FUTURE THAN WE HAVE IN THE PAST. WE HAVE STRENGTH 
TODAY AND THAT STRENGTH :MUST BE MAINTAINED. WE AilE 
FAR BETTER PREP AR.ED AT THIS MOMENT THAN WE WEllE PRIOR 
TO ANY OF THE WARS IN WHICH THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN ENGAGED. 
OT.m. NAVY IS THE STRONGEST IN THE WOIUJ). IT IS LAllGER THAN 
ALL THE REST OF THE WORLD'S FLEETS PUT TOGETHER. WE 
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ARE PER.ATING A TOT , 0~ 5-30 AlR CRAFT CARRIERS OF ALL 
AN 
TYPES AND WE MAINT AIM/AMPHIBIOUS LlF'T IN COMMISSIO FOR 
TWO DIVISIONS. WE AltE F AlRL Y WELL PREPARED AGAINST ANY 
THRE T Y SUBMARI • 0 THE SOME 4,00 SOVIET SUBMARINES 
PO BL Y TEN ARE OF THE MODERN SNORKEL LONG- RANGE TYPE; 
OTHE 75-100 ARE CONVENTIONAL OCEAN-GOING TYPES: ALL ... 
THE REST (ARE SMALL COASTAL SUBMARINES OR OLD WEDIUM-
GE V ELS. THE UNITED STATES HAS MOllE LONG- RANGE 
OCEAN -GOING UBMARINES THAN THE USSIANS AND OUR DEFENSES 
AGAINST SUBMARINE ATTACKS ARE BY NO MEANS WEAK. 
ON THE QUESTIONS OF AI POWER, WE ARE NOT WEAKER 
I NUM ER THOUGH 1E ! Y E BEHIND TEMPOR.ARIL Y IN THE 
NUMBER OF MODERN TACTICAL TYPES. THE NAVY AND THE MARINE 
CORPS HAS AN INVENTORY OF ABOUT 13. 000 PLANES OF ALL 
MIL! TARY TYPES (INCLUDING TRAJNEllS); THE AIR. FORCE HAS 
ABOUT 21. 0 O. WE ARE STRONGER. THAN THE SOVIET UNION IN 
LONG-RANGE LAND-..SED BOMBERS AND IN NAVAL PLANES BOTH 
CARRIER- ASED AND PAT OL-TYP.E. THE VIETS HAVE GREATER. 
STRENGTH THAN E 00 IN LAND-BAS D TACTICAL YPES FO 
SUPPORT 0 GROUND ARMIES. INTERCEPTIO , AND AY- IGJ:ITER 
WISSIO 
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THE .AIR. FORCE HAS ACTIVATED U:OB.E THAN 100 GROUPS-· 
NUMBERING ROM '0 TO 75 PL ES EACH-- BUT P OB LY NO 
10RE TH 75 OF THES • GROUPS ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL AT 
nns TI ~E. OUR AIR PO ER IS IN TRANSITION ' OM PROPELLER-
DRIVEN. SLO -SPEED TYPES TO JET-POVl RED TRANSSONIC AND 
SUPERSONIC TYPES. IN THE LATT FIELD THE RUSSIANS APPEAR 
AT TiiE ~0 NT TO BE AT LEAST ·QUAL TO, POSSIBLY SUPERIOR. 
TO U'""• 
THE .AIRCRAFT P ODUCT ON OF THE T 1!0 COUNTRIES IS 
P OBABLY ABOUT THE SAME WITH THE YEARLY OUTCOME AVE .. ACilNG 
BETWEEN 12, 0 ·14, 00 MILlT Y TYPES. ONE DIFFERENCE THOUCiH , 
AND IT IS IMPORTANT ONE, IS THAT E ARE PRODUCING MORE 
PLANES IN TERMS OF AIRFRAME WEIGHT RICH MEANS ORE 
OF OUR OUTPUT REP E ENTS HEAVY COMPLICATED JET Ot!BERS. 
OUR GREATEST APP ~ENT DISADVANTAGE IS ON LAND. THE MARINES 
HAVE 3 DIVISIONS AND THE AR ~y M <\INTAINS ZO DIVISI NS. OF THE 
ARMY DIVISIONS, 6 iiTH ONE ARINE DIVISION ARE IN KOREA: 
Z TH OJ.c"E MARINE DIVISION ARE I JAP "; SIN EUROPE; 1 IN 
THE UNITED STATES -- PLUS NUMEROUS REGIMENTAL CO !BAT 
TEAMS AND OTHER SMALLER UNIT .. HERE AND AB OAD. OF THE 
7 DIVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. 6 AR EAK -- BELO STRENGTH --
AND ONE READY FOR COMBAT EXCEPT THE IZND AIRBORNE DIVISION. 
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THE RUSSIANS ON THE OTHER HAND MAINTAIN A BASIC 
FRAMEWORK OF 175 DIVISIONS. ON THE BASIS OF COMBAT 
EFFECTIVENESS, WHICH INCLUDES MOBILITY, FIRE POWER, ETC. , 
IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE 175 RUSSIAN DIVISIONS WOULD 
APPROXIMATELY EQUAL NO MORE THAN 70-90 AMERICAN-TYPE 
DIVISIONS. THE SOVIET'S ADVANTAGE OF LAND POWER IS VERY 
GREAT, PAltTICULARLY SINCE THE RUSSIANS COULD MOBILIZE FROM 
100-300 ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS IN 90 DAYS, WHEREAS THE UNITED 
STATES RESERVE STRENGTH IS IN NO SENSE ORGANIZED, TRAINED, 
OR EQUIPPED FOR COMBAT WITHOUT A LONG PREPARA TOllY PERIOD 
AFTER WAR STAlt.TS. FURTHERMORE, ALTHOUGH THE STRENGTH 
OF THE SOVIET ARMY IS PRACTICALLY THE SAME AS IT WAS AT THE 
END OF WORLD WAR U -- 175 DIVIS10NS, NUMBERING APPROXIMATELY 
• MILLION-- THE FACT IS THAT ALMOST ALL THE SOVIET DIVISIONS 
HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY MODERNIZED, MECHANIZED AND BROUGHT 
UP TO DATE. ON THE BASIS OF WHAT I HAVE SAID IT IS APPARENT 
THAT AT THE MOMENT THE RUSSIANS HAVE A GREATER ADVANTAGE 
ON LAND. THIS, THEREFORE, MUST BE COMPENSATED FOR BY A 
~ONTINUING AMElUCAN ADVANTAGE IN THE AIR AND AT SEA, AN 
ADVANTAGE WHICH WE HOLD TODAY AND WHICH WE MUST, IN MY 
OPINION, ACCELER.A TE TO A GREATER DEGREE IN THE AIR. OUR 
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AIR STRENGTH IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO IN AIR SUPER.l01UTY OVER 
WESTERN EUROPE OR NORTHEAST ASIA. WE ARE FORTUNATE 
THOUGH IN HAVING SOME HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS AMONG 
OUR ALLIES IN NATO, ALLIES ACTUALLY OF POTENTIAL STRENGTH IN AIR 
POWER HEREAS IN CONTRAST, THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES BEHIND THE 
IRON CURTAIN ARE CHIEFLY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET FACTORIES FOR 
THEIR AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT. BlUTISH DESIGN IS ABREAST, OR, 
IN SOME RESPECTS, AHEAD OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN 
FIGHTER TYPES AND IN MEDIUM OR SHORT-RANGE JET BOMBERS. 
THOUGH BRITISH AIR PO ER IS WEAK QUANTITATIVELY TODAY AND 
DEPENDENT CHIEFLY UPON U.S. F-86 JET FIGHTERS AND U.S. B-Z9 
BOMBERS, THE FUTURE QUALITATIVE PICTURE IS BRIGHT. THUS TO 
OUR OWN STRENGTH IN EUROPE MUST BE ADDED THE STRENGTH OF 
NATO. DESPITE ~HAT SOME PEOPLE IN THIS COUNTRY SAY, NATO 
IS A GREAT ASSET TO THE FREE WORL~AND THE INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT 
OF WESTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE RUHR~IS 
TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT. THE DIVISIONS, B..EETS AND AIR 
FORCES OF THE THIRTEEN COUNTIUES IN THE NATO LLIANCE, ARE 
NOT TO BE TAKEN LIGHTLY. EXCLUSIVE OF 5 UNITED STATES 
DIVISIONS, NATO TODAY CAN PUT INTO THE FIELD 49 DIVISIONS IN 
WESTERN EUROPE PLUS 10 SMALL ONES IN GREECE; Z2 LARGE ONES 
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I TURKEY, 33 IN YUGOSLAVIA, AND NOW, I HOPE SOME SPANISH 
DIVISIONS. TinS COMPARES FAVORABLY WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN 
SAT ELUTE STRENGTH OF APPROXIM.A TELY SO DIVISIONS. OUR 
ALLIES ALSO OPERATE OVER 4, 000 AIRCRAFT AND MORE THAN 
1, 000 ANTISUBMAR.INE AND COASTAL NAVAL VESSELS. 
IN THE PACIFIC THERE ARE NOW 15 SOUTH KOREAN DIVISIONS WITH 
THE POSSIBILITY THAT 5 MORE WILL BE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED 
SOON. THERE ARE NOW THE BEGINNING OF 6 ARMED DIVISIONS 
IN JAPAN; CHIA 0 KAI-SHEK HAS 21 DIVISIONS ON FORMOSA AND IN 
INDO-CHINA THE FRENCH HAVE THE EQUIVALENT TO 10 DIVISIONS 
AND IN MALAYA THE BRITISH HAVE 2-3. THERE AilE OTHER UNITS 
ALL OVER ASIA AND THE PACIFIC BUT EVEN HERE THE BACK-BONE 
OF STRENGTH IS AMElUCA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CHINESE 
COMMUNIST AllMY IS ESTlMA TED AT 4 MILLION. IN ADDIT10_51N 
OTHER ASIATIC COUNTRIES THl:RE ARE FURTHER FORCES OF 
GUE RlLLAS WHO ARE SUPPORTED AND KEPT IN THE FIGHT BY 
SUPPLIES FllO SOVIET RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE. 
THIS, THEN, IS WHERE WE STAND TODAY·- CONSIDERABLY 
BETTER. <';)FF, IN A MILITARY SENSE, THAN ~HERE WE STOOD THREE 
YEARS AGO, BUT BY NO MEANS SECURE. IN SOME WAYS E HAVE 
GAINED BY TIME; IN SOME AYS WE HAVE LOST. E ARE STRONGER 
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IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS VIS-A-VIS SOVIET RUSSIA THAN WE WEllE, 
AND WE HAVE PROBABLY GAINED RELATIVELY IN ATOMIC WEAPONS, 
THOUGH TIUS RELATIVE GAIN CANNOT CONTINUE. 
WESTERN EUROPE IS NO LONGER DEFENSELESS; THE DAYS 
OF A RUSSIAN BLITZKRIEG AND PUSHOVER ARE GONE. TUGOSLA VIA 
HAS THROWN HER LOT IN WITH THE WEST IN EUROPE. OUR STRENGTH 
IS NOW SUFFICIENT TO FORCE RUSSIAN RE-ENFORCEMENT AND THUS 
TO GIVE US WARNING OF ANY ATTACK. 
WE ARE NO LONGER IN THE DIRE DANGER IN KOREA THAT WE 
WERE IN 1950; AND THE FRENCH -- FACED IN 1950 WITH THE LOSS OF 
THE WHOLE RED RIVER VALLEY IN INDO-CIUNA --ARE CERTAINLY 
BETTER OFF TODAY, HAVING GAINED SOME ADVANTAGES IN THE WAR 
OF ATTRITION IN THE PAST TWO TEARS. IN THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYA, 
AND BURMA, THE COMMUNIST ARMED STRUGGLE HAS DEFINITELY LOST 
STRENGTH. 
OUlt READY MlLITAJlY STRENGTH IS CONSIDEilABLE, AND OUlt 
TREMENDOUS MlLITAltY POTENTIAL CAN BE FAR MORE QUICKLY 
REALIZED THAN TWO YEARS AGO. 
BUT TO OFFSET THESE GAINS IS THE FACT THAT COMMUNIST 
CHINA HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED, RATHER THAN WEAKENED, BY THE 
KOREAN WAll. THIS VAST ASIATIC POWER. SEEMS TO BE MORE SOLIDLY 
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UNDER CONTROL OF ITS TOTALITARIAN LEADERSHIP THAN IT WAS 
TWO YEARS AGO. AND CERTAINLY IT HAS MADE AMAZING STRIDES 
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MILITARY POWER·- PARTICULARLY 
IN THE AIR (THERE ARE NOW Z, 500 TO 3, 000 CHINESE PLANES. 
FURNISHED BY RUSSIA). THUS THE CHINESE RED ARMY'S WEAK-
NESSES IN AIR POWER, .ANTIAIJlCllAFT, ARTILLERY. COMMUNICA-
TIONS, AND MOBILITY OF SUPPLY HAVE BEEN TOA LARGE EXTENT 
(THOUGH NOT, OF COURSE, COMPLETELY) REMEDIED, AND Wlt MAY 
BE WITNESSING IN THE OlUENT A HISTORIC PHENOMENON OF 
TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE TO OUR TIME -- THE EMERGENCE OF 
CHINA FROM FEUDAUSM INTO A MODERN STATE. 
THERE IS ANOTHER DEBIT IN THE BALANCE SHEET, CAUSED 
(BUT ONLY PARTIALLY) BY THE FRUSTRATION OF KOREA. IT IS A 
LACK OF DRIVE AND A DECLINING SENSE OF URGENCY -- A SOME-
TIMES APATHETIC MORALE ..... AND THE NATIONAL FltiCTIONS AND 
DIFFERENCES THA. T WEAKEN THE ANTI-COMMUNIST COALITION. 
WHERE, THEN, DO WE CiO FROM HERE ... WITH CR.ISIS NOT 
ENDED BUT COMPOUNDED? 
AT THIS TIME A PRECISE ANSWER 1S NOT POSSIBLE. THE 
FIRST EISENHOWER DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AID BUDGET JS 
UNDOUBTEDLY INDICATIVE OF A TllEND TO "STRETCH OUT' AND 
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' CUT BACK ' , AND YET TO MAINTAIN A STRONG MlLITAllY POSTURE. 
BOT NO FIRM IDEA OF HERE WE AilE GOING·- 011. HO FAST .... ts 
POSSIBLE UNTIL: (a) THE FOUR NE MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHlEFS 
OF STAFF HA. VE "SHAKEN DOWN" IN THEIR DU'IJES, AND ARE 
FUNCTIONING AS A TEAM; (b) COMPLETE REVIEW OF STltATEGIC 
PLANS AND LEVELS OF AR.MED ST ENGTH HAS BEEN MADE BY THE 
NEW CtnEFS OF STAFF; (e) THE EISENHOWER DEFENSE BUDGET FOil 
THE 1955 FISCAL YEAR HAS BEEN PREPA ED; AND (d) 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANING OF RECENT INTEIUfAL 
EVENTS IN USSIA AND CLARlFlCA TION OF THE COWMUNISTS' 
91PEACE11 GESTU ES HAVE BEEN MADE. 
THERE IS, HOW VER, NO DOUBT THAT CONGRESS AND MUCH 
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY ARE IN AN ECONOMY MOOD; THAT THE 
FORM OF ECONOMIC ISOLATIONISM WHICH EXPRESSES ITSELF IN 
HIGH TARIFF BAR IERS AND IN SHARP REDUCTIONS IN FOREIGN AID 
IS GAINING STRENGTH; AND THAT, WHILE AIR POWEll STILL HAS A 
GltEA T POLITICAL AND POPULAR APPEAL, MANY CONGRESSMEN 
BELIEVE THERE IS MUCH WASTE AND " FAT11 IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET. 
UNLESS THE WORLD ClU.$ S!1ARPENS, THE ARMED SERVICES AND 
ESPECIALLY THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM AR.E CEltTAINLY IN FOR. A 
PERIOD OF DOLLAR RETRENCHMENT . 
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THE 195-4 DEFENSE BUDGET, · PREPARED BY THE TRUMAN 
ADMINlSTllATION BUT HASTILY REVISED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WILSON AND PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, SHO S THE TREND CLEARLY. 
EXPENDITURES DURING THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR ILL NOT BE 
GREATLY REDUCED BECAUSE OF PRIOR CONTRACTS AND A BALANCE 
OM THE BOOKS OF BlLUOJIIS OF DOLLAllS OF AUTHOJUZED FUNDS 
W!DCH HA. VE NOT YET BEEN OBLIOA TED OR SPENT. 
HOWEVER, A DEEP CUT OF MORE THAN $5 BILLION WAS 
APPLIED TO THE TRUMAN ARMED FORCES APPROPIUA TJON REQUEST 
FOR FISCAL 195-4. SUCH A CUT WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY ACTUAL 
REDUCTION OF EXISTING OPERATINCi UNITS; IT WILL NOT CUT, TJUS 
YEAR, INTO BONE Olt MUSCLE OR SINEW• BUT IT WILL MEAN A 
REDUCTION IN DELIVElUES OF AIRCRAFT AND OTHER ITEMS IN 
FUTURE YEARS. FURTHERMORE, IT ALMOST CERTAINLY IMPLIES 
ABANDONMENT OF THE 143-GROUP PROGRAM OF THE AIR FORCE. 
THE 1M MEDIATE RESULTS ARE THAT THE SERVICES WILL 
BE REDUCED TJ:U.S YEA& BOTH IN NUMBEllS OF MEN IN UNIFORM AND 
IN NUMBEllS OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES; THAT SOME ORDERS FOR NEW 
EQUIPMENT WILL MOT BE PLACED; AND ALSO THAT SOME EXISTING 
ORDERS WILL BE EITHER CANCELLED, CUT BACK, OR STRETCHED 
OUT. 
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THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS AilE MORE IMPORTANT. THE CUT 
SEEMS TO MEAN THAT THE EXPANSION AND GROWTH OF THE ARMED 
FORCES -- THOUGH NOT THEUl MODERNIZATION -- IS TO BE HALTED 
AT PRESENT LEVELS WELL BELOW THE ''PLATEAU OF STRENGTH" 
WHICH HAD BE THE GO L OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTI\A TION. 
THE TRUMA EXP NSION PttOGRAM, HASTILY INVOKED 
AFTER THE 1<0 EAN Alt. HAD AS ITS GOALS AN ARMY OF Zl 
ACTIVE DIVlSIONS (PLUS 18 REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAMS, ETC.), 
A NAVY 0 MORE THAN 1, ZOO ACTIVE OPERA nNG VESSELS AND SOME 
15, 000 MODEll AIB.CJ'lAFT (lNCLUDJNCi MAIUNE AIR.CllAFT), A MAIUNE 
CORPS OF 3 DIVISIONS AND 3 Ailt WINGS, AND AN A1R FOJ'lCE OF 143 
GROUPS, MOST OF THEM EQUIPPED WITH MODERN POSTWAR AIR-
CRAFT TO A TOTAL OF ABOUT Zl, 000 PLANES. THE TAilOET DATE 
FOR THESE GOALS WAS OlUGINALLY MlD-1954; TinS WAS STilETCHED 
OUT UNDER P ESIDENT TRUMAN TO 1955-1956. 
WHEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWE TOOK OFFICE, THE AltMY WAS 
SHY ONLY ONE OF ITS Zl DIVISIONS, THOUGH MANY OF ITS UNITS WERE 
INCOMPLETE; AND THE NAVY WAS ON THE WHOLE IN GOOD SHAPE, 
THOUGH IT BADLY NEEDED NEW .JETS FOR ITS CARRIERS AND A 
PROGllA.M OF SHIPBUILDING AND SlUP CONVERSION. THUS THE 1U4Y 
AND NAVY HAD ALMOST JlEACHED THE LEVELS OF THEm NUMERICAL 
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EXPANSION, THOUGH THEIR. CORRESPONDING MODERNIZ TIO 
PltOGllAM AS BUT HALF COMPLETED. 
THE AIR FORCE. HOWEVE • HAD R ACHED POSSIBLY 10 
GROUPS ON ITS WAY TO THE 143-0R.OUP GOAL. MOREOVER. NOT 
MORE THAN 7S OF THESE WE E .FULLY OPERATIONA , AND THERE 
WAS STILL A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF OBSOLESC T OltLD AR D 
TYPE AmCRAFT. 
IN SUM, THE NEW PllOGltAM SEEMS TO MEAN -- SUBJECT 
TO THE QUAUFYING FACTOilS PREVIOUSLY MENTIO ED .... THAT 
THE AllMT WILL STABILIZE AT ABOUT ITS PRE ENT STRENGTH OF 
ZO DIVISIONS (MANY UNDER STRENGTH); THE AVY MAY ULTIMAT LY 
BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT IN SIZE; AND THE Am. FORCE WILL 
STABILIZE AT SOMETHING OVER 100 GROU BUT CONSIDERABLY 
LESS THAN 143. 
ALSO, THE NEW ' 'PLATEAU OF STRENGTH" ·- LOWER THAN 
THE OLD-- WILL PROBABLY BE REACHED (IN~OFA AS COMPLETE 
MODERNIZATION OF THESE VICES IS CO CE ED) SOMEWHAT LATER 
THAN THE PREVIOUS 1955-1956 DEADUN • 
THE REVISED GOALS, PLUS THE SLOWOOW , I THE NATO 
PROGRAM, MAY ULTIMATELY RESULT IN 50 E HAT GREATER COMBAT 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CTIVE UNITS EVEN THOUGH THE TOTAL 
STJlEKOTH WILL BE LESS. ON BALANCE, THE CALCULATED MILITARY 
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RISK HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT lNCtlEASED, FOR. THERE HAS BEEN NO 
CHANGE IN OUlt ESTIMATE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
SAVE THE OBVIOUS STRUGGLE FOR POWER NOW GOING ON IN THE 
KR~LIN. 
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